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# **National Intelligence Bulletin**

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November 10, 1975

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
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### MOROCCO - SPANISH SAHARA

King Hassan abruptly canceled his mass march into Spanish Sahara yesterday, strongly implying that he had the basis of an agreement with Spain for a negotiated settlement favorable to Morocco.

In a brief speech from Agadir, King Hassan ordered his countrymen to return to Tarfaya, the closest assembly point in southern Morocco for the march. He said the march had "accomplished its mission" and hinted that Morocco's claim to the territory will be resolved through negotiations. It may take a few days for all the marchers to return, because a second column of marchers crossed the border Saturday some 50 miles east of the main group.

Hassan stressed his desire for a new era of relations with Spain and praised the Spanish army for avoiding a confrontation with the marchers.

The King's speech came only 24 hours after he had held talks in Agadir with a senior Spanish official. Hassan did not reveal any specifics of an understanding or a framework for future negotiations, but he has too much personal prestige at stake to back down empty-handed.

The cancellation of the march will defuse tensions in the area and provide a more conducive atmosphere for further talks with Madrid. At the same time, however, Hassan will be under growing domestic pressure to demonstrate soon that progress is being made toward a settlement favorable to Morocco.

Morocco and Spain will still have to overcome or ignore Algerian opposition to a direct transfer of Spanish Sahara to Morocco and to Mauritania, which also claims the territory. Hassan pointedly ignored Algeria in his speech; he opposes Algerian participation in any negotiations on Spanish Sahara. He is unwilling to accept a referendum on self-determination, as Algiers had demanded, despite Spanish assurances that the results could be manipulated.

Several hours after the King's speech, the Spanish radio broadcast an editorial expressing approval of his action ending the march.

\* \* \* \*

Military activity over the weekend appeared to be at a low level, and no clashes were reported. [REDACTED]

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Meanwhile, both Algeria and Spain continued to reinforce their forces, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The US defense attache and press reports from Madrid indicate that Spanish troops, including at least two infantry battalions, and equipment were still being moved to the Spanish Sahara. [REDACTED]

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### BANGLADESH

A revolt by enlisted men and noncommissioned officers that erupted in Dacca on Saturday appears to be easing, and conditions are returning to normal. The revolt emphasizes the lack of discipline among the troops and the difficulty the new government faces in imposing its authority on the army.

A resurgence of fighting could easily lead to widespread turmoil and the exodus of much of Bangladesh's sizable Hindu minority to India. Officials in New Delhi have indicated in recent months that a flight of refugees into India, such as the massive influx in 1971, could result in Indian military intervention. So far, it does not appear that New Delhi has decided to intervene.

The streets of Dacca seem calm, and shops have reopened. The government has reaffirmed its warning against strikes and demonstrations and has cautioned the public against spreading rumors.

The origins of the mutiny are obscure; it appears to have developed out of the confusion surrounding the ouster and killing of General Musharraf on Friday and the subsequent rise to power of General Zia ur-Rahman. Enlisted men apparently played a large role in Musharraf's fall, and the government has not fully regained control over them.

The mutinous elements, including some extreme leftists, took advantage of the confusion to make demands on their officers for better treatment of enlisted personnel and for release of some political prisoners. Other troops reportedly settled old scores with officers. Several officers have allegedly been killed and many others have been detained.

President Sayem has released some leftist political prisoners who are influential with the rebellious troops.

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Strongman Zia, who is reported to be popular in the military, has been trying to assert his authority, but he faces a difficult task imposing discipline. The US embassy in Dacca reports that the events of the past few days reveal that the officers have less influence over troops than was generally believed. This situation is complicated by contention in the officer corps between those who fought in the 1971 war of independence and those who were held in Pakistan until 1973.

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UN

The UN General Assembly today takes up three resolutions on Middle East issues that could have permanent repercussions on support of the organization's work.

Concluding its week of debate on the Palestine issue, the Assembly will likely vote on two resolutions on the rights of the Palestinians. Following those votes, it will begin its debate on the resolution—passed last month in one of its subsidiary committees—equating Zionism with racism.

The three resolutions have set off intense debate within the Arab group itself. A final unified position on the more controversial Palestinian resolution—calling for PLO participation in any Middle East peace conferences—was reportedly worked out only on Friday, primarily owing to Algerian Foreign Minister Bouteflika's efforts to forge a common Arab front. This resolution, originally put forth by Egypt, calls for the PLO to be invited to participate in any UN-sponsored peace conference on the Middle East.

The resolution also calls for the Security Council to adopt necessary measures to enable the Palestinians to exercise their national rights. The Egyptian draft had not been as explicit in its reference to Palestinian rights.

The second PLO resolution, originally sponsored by Syria, calls for the establishment of a special committee that would work out a timetable for implementing last year's resolution affirming the rights of the Palestinian people to a national homeland and self-determination. It also contains an implicit threat of Israel's suspension or expulsion from the UN if it obstructs the committee's work.

The resolution equating Zionism with racism, however, goes beyond previous General Assembly condemnations of Israel. In its politicization of UN activities, the resolution may lead to further erosion of support for the organization. Most Western and developed countries are strongly opposed to it, as are those African states that fear their campaign against racial discrimination and apartheid could be jeopardized by the linkage with Zionism.

While most countries are hesitant to oppose an Arab-sponsored initiative openly, a motion to defer a vote on the resolution until next year appears to have wide support. Chances are good that Sierra Leone might propose such a motion, defusing the issue at least for this session.

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### SPAIN

The Spanish Communist Party, which reportedly had agreed to hold off calling for any strikes, now has appealed for a general strike through the Communist-dominated, clandestine Workers Commissions, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] The appeal urged "democratic action to mobilize the masses." A date for the strike has not been set, but a week to ten days after Franco's death would be the most likely time.

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Most of the non-Communist elements in the clandestine labor groups allegedly oppose a strike call, indicating that it is likely to fail. Only in Barcelona and Madrid, where Communist cadre have control over workers in some factories, is there likely to be a positive response. A strike effort would be likely to provoke police repression and strengthen the far right.

The strike call may be an effort by the Communists to regain their revolutionary image. They apparently feel it was tarnished by their participation in the recent joint declaration of leftist opposition groups, which did not include the communist dogma rejecting Juan Carlos as king.

A sudden crackdown on the press, meanwhile, is likely to have raised political tensions. Several weekly magazines that urged reform have been seized, and over the weekend the editor of *Ya*, the prestigious Madrid daily, was charged with attacking the constitution. The charge stemmed from an article published last week urging changes designed to increase democratic participation after power has passed to Juan Carlos.

The decision to impose censorship may have been made in the Information Ministry without consultation with Juan Carlos or his advisers. [REDACTED]

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### FOR THE RECORD

VIETNAM: As expected, the Vietnamese communists yesterday announced plans for reunifying the country. According to Radio Hanoi, a recently held special meeting of the National Assembly standing committee called for "rapidly completing reunification." Saigon and Hanoi, according to the broadcast, will appoint delegations to a "joint political conference" to draw up plans for new national assembly elections and new "common" state organs. No exact timetable was given, however, and the process may not be completed soon.



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